






























INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN RURAL 
HOUSEHOLDS: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
Américo Mendes  





Intergenerational transfers in rural households: 




Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes 
 
Portuguese Catholic University 
Faculty of Economics and Management  
Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327 










 The household membership decision is viewed as a “research 
project” where the offspring invests in human and non human capital 
to influence the probability of finding an alternative to the parental 
household. The problem is formulated as a differential game between 
a selfish offspring and altruistic parents. The solution is consistent 
with facts” such as the “flexibility of inheritance systems” and the 
“generational fragmentation” of the family property when the 
economic opportunities expand outside the parental household. 
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1.   THE ISSUES
 
 The literature on farm offspring household membership decisions has pointed out the 
following facts: 
 - peasant families have "two conflicting aims: to keep family property intact and to provide 
for younger children" (Habakkuk, 1955, p. 1); 
 - there is "flexibility of the inheritance systems" (Hill, 1986, p. 95) in the sense that the 
formal or informal norms regulating the intergenerational wealth transfers are the object of 
manipulation by the parents and the offspring (Goody et al., 1976; Gagan, 1976; Silva, 1976, 
1983; Berkner and Mendels, 1978; Brandão, 1988; Perrier-Cornet et al., 1991); as more 
income earning opportunities emerge outside the family production unit, the tension between 
the conflicting aims mentioned by Habakkuk decreases, so that "generational fragmentation" 
(Hutson, 1987) of the family property is more likely to happen (Guither, 1963; Goody et al., 
1976, Alston and Schapiro, 1984; Florey and Guest, 1988; Tsuya and Martin, 1992); 
 - all other things being equal, the offspring have more tendency to stay in the parental farm 
the larger the farm size is (Marsden, 1984; Brandão, 1988). 
 
2.   CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
 
 It is useful to distinguish four types of intergenerational relationships: 
 - intergenerational farm decision making transfers (succession); 
 - intergenerational wealth transfers (inheritance) inter vivos or post mortem; 
 - intergenerational income transfers; 
 - intergenerational family extension. 
 By focusing on the offspring household membership decisions we will be dealing mostly 
with the third and fourth types of intergenerational relationships and the interdependences 
between these two types of issues. 
 With the exception of Becker's work (1974, 1981) and the "strategic bequest motive" 
approach initiated by Bernheim et al. (1985) and pursued by Sundstrom and David (1988), the 
literature on intergenerational wealth and income transfers has not explicitely modelled the 
strategic interactions between parents and offspring. So a serious handicap of the literature up 
to Becker and Bernheim et al. is that it cannot account for the manipulative behaviours of 
parents and offspring documented in the empirical literature. 
 Becker's main contribution is known as the "rotten kid theorem". This theorem is based on 
the following assumptions: 
 - the child is selfish and the parent is altruistic; 
 - the child's consumption is a normal good for the parent; 
 - the utility of parent and children depends solely on transferable consumer goods; 
 - the sequence of the decision process goes as follows: the child takes some action that 
affects both his income and parent's income; after the child has made his choices, the parent 
makes a money transfer to the child. 
 If these assumptions hold, the selfish child will choose actions which maximize the family 
income. 
 The "rotten kid theorem" plays an important role in the macrodynamics literature because 
it provides a basis for the "Ricardian equivalence theorem" (Barro, 1974) which states that 
public forced intergenerational wealth transfers (e.g. public debt) are subsequently undone by 
the private actions of parents and children so that government intergenerational redistribution 
programs are neutralised and have no real effects. 
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 In Becker's theory the parents have no need to behave strategically: the selfish child 
maximizes utility by choosing an action that maximizes the family income. So the parents 
cannot do better for the maximization of family income than making the "automatic" money 
transfer needed to adjust to the child's best choice. No manipulation of the transfer by the 
parents can improve upon family income. 
 A problem with Becker's approach is that it is not appropriate when the parents or the 
child's utilities do not depend solely on transferable commodities. So it fails, for example, in 
the situation where the parents supply money transfers to their children who in turn provide 
the parents with an in-kind service ("attention"). Bernheim et al. (1985) set up a non 
cooperative game showing that, in this case, parents need to engage in strategic behaviour in 
order to obtain "filial attention" from their children. To do so they have to establish a bequest 
rule and precommit to it before children choose their actions, threatening them with 
disinheritance if they don't behave according to the parents' wants. This is called the 
"strategic bequest motive". 
 This result does not require parents and child to be selfish. The parents can be altruistic 
and the child can derive utility from the attention supplied to the parents. What the "strategic 
bequest motive" says is that the parents want more attention than the child would have 
provided in the absence of bequest. 
 This non-cooperative game-theoretical approach is a promising one. The evidence 
provided in the paper by Bernheim et al. strongly suggests that parents behave strategically. 
There are, however, some critical remarks to make to the non-cooperative set up in Bernheim 
et al. (1985). 
 1. These authors ignore the existence of exogenous social norms regarding 
intergenerational wealth transfers. They assume complete freedom of the parents in terms of 
establishing the bequest. The reality is that parents have to take into account exogenous 
bequest rules established by law or social custom. So a more interesting set up would be to 
represent the parents' strategic bequest behaviour as oscillating around the socially established 
bequest rules. The model could, then, predict under what economic conditions private 
intergenerational wealth transfers would conform or would deviate from the social norms. 
This is the kind of model proposed here. 
 2. Another problem with the model by Bernheim et al. is that it does not account for the 
trade off between the parents' household economic security and an equitable treatment of 
children. The results of our model will reflect this trade off. 
 3. Bernheim et al. are simply interested in "cash bequest for filial attention type of 
exchanges", without caring whether or not the offspring is contributing to the parents' 
production unit. So their approach has to be reframed if one is interested in the analysis of the 
intergenerational continuity of the family farm undertaking and the timing of the offspring's 
exit. The model proposed here can deal with this issue. 
 The work of Sundstrom and David (1988) was preceeded by a formal treatment of the 
problem (David and Sundstrom, 1984) as an n-person cooperative bargaining game. The 
authors proved that an expansion of labour market opportunities beyond the parental 
household increases the bargaining power of the children and reduces their economic value 
for the parents. 
 Bernheim et al. and Sundstrom & David do not deal specifically with the offspring 
household membership decision. McElroy (1985) proposed a Nash bargaining model for this 
type of decision, but it is a static model which cannot deal with the issue of timing of the 
offspring's exit. 
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 The Rural Sociology literature has paid some attention to the issues of succession and 
inheritance in agriculture. A good account of this research is given in the recent book by 
Gasson and Errington (1993). These issues have deserved much less interest among 
agricultural economists. Most of their research is normative and has focused on the issue of 
optimal planning and financing of intergenerational land transfers (Harrison et al., 1968; Levi 
and Allwood, 1969; Boehlje and Eisgruber, 1972; Longworth, 1972; Reinders et al., 1980; 
Tauer, 1985). An interesting exception is the work of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) who 
appeal to the gains from farm specific human capital to explain intergenerational family 
extension, cost advantages of family relative to hired labor and the scarcity of land sales. This 
idea of taking into account the accumulation of human capital is an important one and will be 
explored here but with a different orientation: 
 - we take into account the fact that the offspring may accumulate not only farm specific 
human capital but also off farm capital; 
 - we also take into account the fact that the returns to the offspring’s farm specific human 
capital depend on the intrafamilial income distribution controlled by the parents and the 
strategic interactions between parents and offspring about household membership. 
 
3.   MAIN FEATURES OF THE MODEL
 
 The approach to this problem captures the strategic interactions within the farm 
households concerning intergenerational income transfers. The offspring have the choice to 
stay in the parents' household, contributing to family income and benefiting from the home 
consumption of goods and services, or to leave and be sovereign in the generation and 
allocation of his income. Parents have the authority to decide about the intra-household 
income distribution, taking into account the fact that this distribution will influence the 
offspring's household membership decisions. So the problem will be modelled in game 
theoretical terms to account for those strategic interactions. 
 The second feature of this approach is to look at this decision problem as a "research 
project" (Reinganum, 1981, 1982). The offspring accumulates knowledge relevant to the 
"project" (investment in formal education or other forms of "human capital", search for a 
partner to marry with, a job alternative to the parents' farm activity and a new place to live, 
etc.). The "timing of completion of the project" (age at which the offspring leaves the parents' 
home) is a random variable dependent on the amount of resources invested in the "project". 
 The model will be formulated at a level of generality encompassing either the cases of an 
exit towards a full time or a part time independent farming occupation, or the case of a 
complete exit from the farm sector. We don't elaborate on this multiple choice problem, 
leaving it out for future research. 
 Since there is no periodic dates at which the offspring's exit decision can occur the model 
should be dynamic. Its outcome will be a hazard function giving the probability that a 
offspring of a certain age still belongs to the parental household. 
 The mathematical construct representing this view of the household membership decision 
is a differential game. With specifications of functional forms for some ingredients of the 
model, namely preferences, it can be explicitly solved to characterize the equilibrium 
strategies of offspring and parents and the probability distribution of the age at which the 
offspring quits the parents' home. 
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4.   ASSUMPTIONS
 
 The model is based on the following assumptions. 
 
 Assumption A1
 At a random time a farm offspring may decide to leave the parents' household. 
 
 Assumption A2
 The offspring's decision is influenced by the parents' decisions about the share of family 
income he receives in case of staying in the parental household. 
 
 Assumption A3
 The offspring's household membership decision is viewed as a "research project"1: 
 - the offspring accumulates knowledge and other forms of capital relevant to the "project" 
(to leave the parents' household) through the expenditure of resources measurable in monetary 
units, denoted by u ; t2 ( )
 - the timing of completion of the "project" is a random variable with a distribution 
influenced by the offspring's accumulation of off farm capital; 
 - if the "project" is successfully completed, the offspring earns an income Y  and the 
rest of the family earns an income Y ; 
t22 ( )
t21 ( )
 - Y  is exogenous and Y  is related to the off farm stock of capital  as follows 
, where  is exogenous and constant over time. 
t21 ( ) t22 ( ) K t2 ( )
Y t mK t22 2( ) ( )= m
 
 Assumption A4
 As long as the offspring stays in the parental household, total family income follows some 
exogenous path Y  out of which the offspring receives an amount u t  decided by the 
parents. Part of this income is used for the offspring's consumption which cannot be smaller 
than some minimum level denoted by , exogenous to this model. 
t1 ( ) 1 ( )
c t1 ( )
 
 Assumption A5
 Parents are viewed as a single agent. 
 
 Assumption A6




 Parents' and offsprings' preferences are intertemporally separable. 
 
 Assumption A8
 The offspring behaves so as to maximize expected income, discounted at some non-
negative rate r . 
 
 Assumption A9




 The family preference aggregation procedure is exogenous to the model and is assumed to 
yield the following current utility function: 
( ) ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]1 01
1
2U t U t U t= <
−α α α 1<  
where  denotes the expected income of the offspring at time ,  denotes the 
expected income of the rest of the family at time  and 
U t2 ( ) t U t1 ( )
t α  denotes the weight attached to the 
offspring's welfare by the family preference aggregation procedure. 
 
 Assumption A11
 Parents' and offspring's decisions are framed in continuous time. 
 
 Assumption A12
 Parents' and offspring's decision horizons are finite, beginning at the age the offspring 
becomes strategically active and ending at an age when this decision problem becomes 
irrelevant. The starting age will be denoted as time zero and the terminal age as time . T2
 Assumption A13
 Parents and offspring have perfect information about all the elements relevant to decision 
making. 
 
5.   COMMENTS ON THE ASSUMPTIONS
 
5.1. INTRAHOUSEHOLD STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS 
 
 This set of assumptions captures the role of economic factors (income earning 
opportunities within and outside the parental household, investment in human and non human 
capital) and some sociological factors (parental authority over family income distribution, 
family preference aggregation procedures, social norms about intergenerational transfers) in 
the offspring's household membership decision. 
 Assumptions A1-A5, A9 and A10 capture some of the strategic interactions within the 
family in a simplified way, by collapsing interdependences to the interaction between one 
offspring and the rest of the family represented by the parents. 
 The structure of decision making within the family unit is assumed to be such that the 
offspring has freedom of choice in the allocation of income between consumption and 
investment in off farm capital. This investment influences positively the probability of finding 
more attractive earning alternatives outside the parental household. Finally, the offspring has 





 According to assumptions A8 and A10, the utility of parents and offspring depend solely 
on transferable consumer goods. So offspring are assumed to be selfish and parents are 
altruistic. The type of altruism implicit in function (1) takes the form of a generalized Nash 
bargaining social welfare function with zero disagreement payoffs. The family income 




 1. Pareto efficiency
 Changing the chosen income distribution to benefit one family member cannot be done 
without making at least another member worse off. 
 
 2. Individual rationality
 No family member gets a zero income. 
 
 3. Scale independence
 Affine transformations of the utility function of the form U  don't change the 
chosen income distribution, that is, the chosen income distribution is independent of the 




 4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives
 Eliminating feasible alternative income distributions that would have not been chosen does 
not affect the distribution chosen by the parents. This property means that the relevant income 
distributions are only those close to the one chosen by the parents2. 
 This way of representing the family decision process supposes that there is some 
bargaining within the household about income distribution, but this process is not modelled 
explicitly. An agreement is reached among the family members and then the parents act as the 
enforcers of that outcome. The "bargaining power" of the offspring in this process is 
represented by the parameter α . 
 
5.3. TIME FRAME 
 
 Because there are no periodic dates at which the exit decision can occur, the model is 
framed in continuous time. 
 
6.   FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
 
 Because of the strategic interactions among family members, the household membership 
decision will be formulated as a game. Since the time frame is continuous and the solution 
concept is perfect equilibrium, the model will be a differential game3. 
 To specify the objective functions of parents and offspring, consider first the offspring's 
expected income U t t2 ( )δ , that is, the utility over the time interval [ , ]t t t+δ . 
 1) At the beginning of the time interval, if the offspring is still in the parents' home, he 
receives an income , out of which he might make some investment in off farm capital. u t1 ( )
 2) The offspring has freedom to leave at any time later if more attractive alternatives come 
up. According to assumption A3, the probability distribution of the timing of offspring's exit 
from the parents' household is related to the offspring's stock of off farm capital. This 
distribution will be denoted  S t12 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 112 11S t P T t S t= ≤ = −  
where  is the survivor function denoting the probability the offspring is still in the 
parents' household by time . 







 Each future increment in off farm capital is equally likely to be the one that allows the 
offspring to leave if that has not yet happened by time t . So the survivor function has an 
exponential distribution as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 11S t P T t e
x t= > = −  
where  is the stock of off farm capital at time . x t( ) t
 According to assumption A3, u  denotes the value of the resources invested in off farm 






 The investment cost in off farm capital u  is equal to . t2 ( ) k t2 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )4 2 2k t u t=  
 We have then the following relationship: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 2 2 200K t k s ds u s ds x t
tt
= = =∫∫  
 Given (3) and (5), u  is a hazard function. So, if t2 ( ) T  denotes the random time of 
departure from the parental household, u  can be interpreted as follows: t2 ( )
( ) ( ) lim ( / )6 12 0u t t
P t T t t T tt= < ≤ +→δ δ
δ >  
  is then the probability of leaving during the arbitrarily small time interval u t2 ( ) ( , ]t t t+ δ  
conditional on the fact that the offspring has not left by time .  is always non negative 
but can be greater than one and therefore is not exactly a conditional probability. However, 
for an arbitrarily small time interval 
t u t2 ( )
( , ]t t t+ δ , u t t2 ( )δ  is a good approximation to the 
conditional probability P t T t t T t( /< ≤ + > )δ . 
 The offspring's expected income at time  denoted by U  is: t t2 ( )
( ) ( ) { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}( )7 2 2 1 2U t dt u t mx t e u t u t dt
x t= + −−  
 By similar arguments, the expression for the current family utility is the following: 
( ) ( ) { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]} { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}( ) ( )8 2 1 2 2 21 1 1




household membership decision problem can be formulated as follows: 
( ) { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}( )9 2 10
2Max e u t mx t e u t u t dtrt x t
T − −+ −∫  
( ) { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]} { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}( ) ( )10 2 1 2 2 21 1 1
1
0
2Max e u t mx t e u t u t u t Y t e Y t u t dtrt x t x t
T − − −+ − × + −∫ α α
( ) . . ( ) / ( )11 2s t dx t dt u t=  
( ) ( ) [ , ]12 0x t ∈ ∞  
( ) ( ) [ , ]13 01u t ∈ ∞  
( ) ( ) [ , ( )]14 02 1u t c t∈  
 (9)-(14) define a differential game with the following features: 
 - there is only one state variable5 x t( ) ; 
 - the control variables appear linearly in the offspring's utility function and non linearly in 
the parents' utility function; 
 - the kinematic equation involves only the control variable u  in a linear fashion. t2 ( )
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7.   SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
 
 To characterize the (not necessarily unique) perfect equilibria of the game defined by 
expressions (9)-(14), we begin with the two current value Hamiltonian functions: 
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , )15 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1H x u u v U x u u v u2= +  
( ) ( , , , ) ( , , )16 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2H x u u v U x u u v u2= +  
where  and  are the current value Lagrange multipliers. v1 v2
 We now look for the strategy choices u x  which are Nash equilibria  v x v xi
*[ , ( ), ( )]1 2
for the Hamiltonian game: 





 The equilibrium strategies do not depend on . This means that the choice of optimal 
strategies by both players depends on the effects of changes in the state variable in so far as 
they affect the offspring's utility but not the parents' utility. This is due to the fact that the 




7.1. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OFFSPRING'S EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES 
 
 As is typical in differential games for an action variable which appears linearly, there is a 
situation of "bang-bang" equilibrium strategies: 
 
 Case 1.1 
( ) ( )*18 02 2u x if v e mx




 Case 1.2 




 In case 1.1, given the parents' optimal strategy choice , the Hamiltonian  is a straight 
line with negative slope equal to 
u1
* H2
( )20 2v e mx
x− +−  
 So it reaches its maximum for the minimum value that  can take which is zero. u2
 In case 1.2, the Hamiltonian function  is still a straight line, given the parents' strategy 
choice, but its slope is now positive. Therefore, the Hamiltonian reaches its maximum for the 
maximum value that  can take. This maximum value is constrained by the amount of 
income  the parents choose to allocate to the offspring. It is constrained also by the 
minimum income the offspring has to spend to meet consumption needs. So, in case 1.2, his 




( ) ( ) ( )* *21 2 1u x u x c= −  
 Calculation of the time path of the costate variable  can be done by starting from the 
following equation of motion: 
v t2 ( )









mu e u ux= − = − + −−  
 The general solution of this equation is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )23 2 10v t mx t e e u s ds C
x t x st= − + + +− −∫  
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 The value of the constant of integration C  can be determined by appealing to the 
transversality condition: 
( ) ( )24 02 2v T =  
to get 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )25 2 10
2
2C mx T e e u s dsx T x s
T
= − −− −∫  
 Substituting this result in expression (23) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )26 2 1 2 00
2
2v t mx t e e u s ds mx T e e u s dsx t x s x T x s
Tt
= − + + + − −− − − −∫∫ 1  
 Using these results, the condition for case 1.1 is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )27 2 10
2
2mx T e e u s dsx T x s
T
− <− −∫  
and for case 1.2 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )28 2 10
2
2mx T e e u s dsx T x s
T
− >− −∫  
 Since the value of the term  is likely to be very small and  is the end point of this 
decision problem, the LHS in expressions (27) and (28) is approximately equal to the wealth 
the offspring can get outside the parental household at time T . It will be called the outside 
wealth at time T . 
e x T− ( )2 T2
2
2
 The RHS in expressions (27) and (28) represents the sum of the income the offspring will 
get from the parents up to time T , if he stays in the parental household. So it is a measure of 
his expected stock of farm capital at that time. 
2
 Results (18), (19), (27) and (28) can be interpreted as follows: 
 - to decide about whether or not it is worth to invest in off farm capital, the offspring 
compares the outside wealth at time  (the time by which the offspring is bound to have 
taken a decision about staying or leaving the home farm) with his expected stock of farm 
capital at that time; 
T2
 - the offspring will make no effort to leave the parental household if the outside wealth at 
time  is less valuable than his expected stock of farm capital at that time and will invest to 
leave the parental household if it is not so. 
T2
 
7.2. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PARENTS' EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES 
 
 The first order condition for the parents' decision problem is the following: 
( ) [ ( )] ( )[ ( )]29 1 01
1












 From (29) we get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *30 1 11 1 2 21 2u x Y e u Y e u mx u
x x= + + − + −α α α α  
For the two cases discussed in the previous section the equilibrium strategies are: 
( ) ( ) ( )* *31 01 1 2 2u x Y u x if v e mx
x= = < −α  
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]( )* *32 11 1 1 1u x Y u x c Ae
x= + − + −α α  
u x u x c if v e mxx2 1 1 2
* *( ) ( )= − > −−  
where 
( ) ( )33 121A Y m≡ − −α α  
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Case 2.1: "Generational consolidation" case6
 This corresponds to equation (31). In this case it is not worth for the offspring to invest in 
off farm capital. The share of the family income he gets is equal to the weight α  ascribed to 
him in the family welfare function. Hereafter, this level of income will be referred to as the 
"offspring's entitlement". This is what Peyton Young (1994) calls the case of "transparent 
equity". 
 
Case 2.2: "Generational fragmentation" case7
 This corresponds to equation (32). In this case it is worth for the offspring to invest in off 
farm capital and u  deviates from the offspring's entitlement 1
* αY1  (case of "transparent 
inequity"). To determine the direction of this deviation, the parents compare the income 
 the offspring can get off the farm, in case of leaving at time , with the income per 
capita of the family members staying with them. 
mx t( ) t
 To see this, consider the term A  in the RHS of expression (32). To interpret its economic 
meaning it is easier to work with the case of an "egalitarian" entitlement structure, that is, one 














 There are three possible cases to consider for the value of A . 
 
Case 2.2.1 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ]* *35 1
11 1 1 1
21u x Y u x c if mx
Y
n
= + − − =
−
α α  
 In this case, the offspring's off farm income at time  is equal to the income per capita the 
other family members would have if the offspring leaves at that time. In this case, the optimal 
strategy choice for the parents is to allocate to the offspring an income greater than his 
entitlement. Rearranging (35) as follows 
t








and considering the entitlement structure α = 1/ n , we can see that the parents' optimal 
strategy choice is such as to allocate to the offspring the portion of family income remaining 
from giving to the other n  family members a total income equal to , that is, an 
income allowing them to reach the same level of consumption as the offspring. 
−1 ( )n c−1 1
 
Case 2.2.2 
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]( )* *37 1 1 0
11 1 1 1
21u x Y u x c Ae with Ae if mx
Y
n
x x= + − + − + − > <
−
α α α  In this 
case, the offspring's off farm income at time  is lower than the income per capita the other 
family members would have if the offspring leaves at that time. The parents' optimal strategy 
choice is to allocate to the offspring an income greater than his entitlement. By investing in 
order to leave the parents' home, the offspring expects to accumulate a greater wealth than by 
staying with the parents forever and his departure will not make the other family members 
poorer than him. The parents help to prepare this departure by giving him an allowance 
greater than his entitlement which reduces the gap between his income outside the farm and 





( ) ( ) [ ( ) ]( )* *38 1 1 0
11 1 1 1
21u x Y u x c Ae with Ae if mx
Y
n
x x= + − + − + − < >
−
α α α  The 
offspring invests in the departure from the parents' home, but if this happens the other family 
members will become poorer than him. In this case, the parents' optimal strategy choice is to 
give him an income smaller than his entitlement. This reduces his possibilities for investing in 
off farm capital and the chances of leaving the home farm. 
 
8.   CONCLUSIONS
 
 1. These results are consistent with the "flexibility of inheritance systems": even though 
there are social norms (formal or informal) about intergenerational wealth and income 
transfers (represented in the model by the parameter α , they are manipulated by the parents 
to influence the behaviour of the offspring. 
 2. The results yield a testable hypothesis about the orientation of those manipulative 
behaviours. 
 a) "Transparently equitable" intergenerational income transfers - the offspring gets an 
income equal to his entitlement if he can accumulate a greater wealth by staying with the 
parents than by leaving; 
 b) "Transparently inequitable" intergenerational income transfers favourable to the 
offspring - he gets more income than his entitlement if he can accumulate a greater wealth by 
leaving and if the family members remaining in the parental household will not become 
poorer than him after his departure; 
 c) "Transparently inequitable" intergenerational income transfers unfavourable to 
the offspring - he gets less income than his entitlement if he can accumulate a greater wealth 
by leaving and if the family members remaining in the parental household will become poorer 
than him after his departure. 
 So it is through mechanisms of "transparently equitable or inequitable" intergenerational 
income transfers towards the offspring that parents try protect their household wealth and 
respond to the Habakkuk's dilemma. 
 3. Either the case of generational consolidation or the case of generational 
fragmentation can happen to the parents' household and property, depending on the 
economic opportunities for the offspring inside and outside the parental household. The 
offspring invests in his departure if he expects to accumulate outside a greater wealth than by 
staying with the parents forever. Therefore, all other things being equal, the pattern of 
generational fragmentation is more likely to be found: 
 - among poor households than among rich households; 




 1. This view of the problem was inspired by applications of differential games to the 
analysis of Research and Development with rivalry (Reinganum, 1981, 1982). 
 2. This assumption has been the object of many criticisms and several authors have 
proposed "more reasonable" alternative assumptions which lead to the same Nash bargaining 
12 
solution. A good discussion of these issues is contained in the set of papers edited by Binmore 
and Dasgupta (1987). 
 3. A useful presentation of differential games is given in Case (1979). 
 4. In this case the marginal cost of investing in off farm capital is constant and equal to 1. 
 5. Differential games with more than one state variable are harder to treat mathematically. 
 6. This expression is taken from Hutson (1987). 
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